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LondonWe study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the LondonMetropolitan Boroughs between 1902 and 1937
under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer suffrage (1902–1914) and universal suffrage (1921–1937). We
argue andﬁnd supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suf-
frage. Taxpayer suffrage, where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked, encourages de-
mands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on
administration costs. Universal suffrage, where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status,
creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year
hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).2 See, e.g., Aidt and Jensen (2009) for evidence that the likelihood of (progressive) in-
come tax during the long 19th century is reduced by suffrage reform; and Kenny and
Winer (2006) for evidence from the post-war period that greater political freedom does
not necessarily lead to more redistribution. Aidt et al. (2010) show that franchise reform
can lead to a reduction in spending. See also Lindert (1994, 2004a,b), Husted and Kenny
(1997), Aidt et al. (2006), Aidt and Eterovic (2011), Aidt and Jensen (2013), and Engerman1. Introduction
Suffrage rules regulate who can vote and this, in turn, inﬂuences
the interests served by elected politicians. While todaywe associate de-
mocracy with equal and universal suffrage, historically the power to
elect or appoint representatives was the privilege of narrow elites.
Suffrage rules focussed on speciﬁc characteristics of the individual
such as ownership of property, payment of taxes, residency and gender.
The logic behind linking the right to vote to property holdings or tax
payments can be traced back to mediaeval Britain and reﬂected the be-
lief that it restricted the franchise to individuals with a longer-term in-
terest in the welfare of the community, akin to the shareholders of
corporations.
Economicmodels in the tradition ofMeltzer andRichard (1981) pre-
dict a straightforward positive link between demands for public goods
and redistribution and extension of the franchise. However, evidence
from analyses of historical data show that the impacts were more44 1223 335475.
, gmooney3@jhmi.edu
.V. This is an open access article ucomplex than predicted by theory and were functions of the speciﬁc
rules that determined who could vote.2 While progress has been made
in understanding the public ﬁnance consequences of franchise exten-
sion, little is known about the inﬂuence these rules have on the incen-
tive to manipulate tax and spending patterns prior to elections in the
quest for votes. A well-established literature, drawing on evidence
from modern democracies and surveyed by Paldam (1997), Alesina
et al. (1997) and most recently by Drazen (2008), offers a strong argu-
ment for the existence of opportunistic political budget cycles in both
national and local elections.3 The construction of cross-country datasetsand Sokoloff (2011).
3 See, for example, Paldam (1979), Roubini and Sachs (1989), Alesina et al. (1992), Blais
andNadeau (1992), Rosenberg (1992), Schuknecht (1996), Franzese (2000), Seitz (2000),
Kneebone and McKenzie (2001), Galli and Rossi (2002), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya
(2004), Andrikopoulos et al. (2004), Shi and Svensson (2006), Veiga and Veiga (2007),
Baleiras and Costa (2004), Mink and de Haan (2006), Foucault et al. (2008), Brender and
Drazen (2008), Vergne (2009), Drazen and Eslava (2010), Potrafke (2010, 2012),
Efthyvoulou (2011), Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011), Aidt et al. (2011), and Klomp
and De Haan (2013b). The literature was initiated by the classical papers by Nordhaus
(1975) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988).
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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rich datasets for local governments (municipalities or states) from the
modern period has tended to draw attention to the experience of the
late 20th and early 21st centuries at the expense of earlier periods. Con-
sequently the focus has been on opportunistic political budget cycles
operating under universal suffrage; quite how the cycle might manifest
itself in polities with economic and social restrictions onwho could vote
has been completely overlooked.
The purpose of this paper is to draw upon the historical experience
of early 20th century London to study the nature of the political budget
cycle under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer suffrage, where
the right to vote is linked to speciﬁc tax payments; and universal suf-
frage, where all adults can vote (withminor qualiﬁcations), irrespective
of their economic status.While the identity of the “pivotal voter” differs
systematically under the two suffrage rules, electorally-motivated poli-
ticians can be expected to be equally determined to manipulate ﬁscal
policy before elections towin support from the pivotal voter.We, there-
fore, conjecture that an opportunistic political budget cyclewill be pres-
ent in both regimes but that its nature will vary systematically with the
suffrage rules.4
The setting for our study is the London Metropolitan Boroughs
(LMBs) before and after the First World War. The 28 LMBs were
established in 1899 and had powers to levy local property taxes, to de-
cide on the provision of local services (sewer connections, bathhouses,
parks, libraries, dairies and milk shops, etc.) and to take out loans to ﬁ-
nance capital expenses on the security of future property taxes. Within
the statutory boundaries, the LMBs had signiﬁcant ﬁscal autonomy and
the elected representatives of the councils could decide on the level,
composition and the timing of key ﬁscal variables. All councillors were
elected every three years. The franchise before the First World War
was based on property tax payment and restricted to men; we refer to
it as taxpayer suffrage. The Representation of the People Act (sometimes
referred to as the Fourth Reform Act) in 1918 eradicated the tax pay-
ment requirement at all levels of government (including for the LMBs)
and introduced almost equal and universal suffrage.5 This quasi-
natural experiment allows us to study the opportunistic political budget
cycle under two different suffrage regimes.6
Besides adding new historical evidence to the debate on the oppor-
tunistic political budget cycle, our study contributes directly to two
more speciﬁc strands of literature.7 Firstly, it signiﬁcantly enhances
our understanding of ﬁscal retrenchment and taxpayer democracy in
Britain. Until 1918, voting rights in local elections linked representation
to the prompt payment of the local property tax (known in Britain as
the rate) such that only local taxpayers had the right to vote. This had
intriguing implications for the relationship between the size of the elec-
torate and local public ﬁnance. In particular when the balance of power
shifted to small-scale, middle class taxpayer-voters, demands were
made for retrenchment and economy rather than ﬁscal expansion, de-
spite apparently large social returns on public investment in local public
goods (Hennock, 1963, 1973; Wohl, 1983; Szreter, 1988, 1997). As4 While the franchise rules may also affect the nature of party politics, we do not expect
systematically different partisan cycles (budget cycles which are driven by differences in
the ideological preposition of themajority party) under the two regimes.We use a robust-
ness check to test the validity of this assumption.
5 The suffrage was neither equal (in that, for example, graduates of certain universities
could vote twice) nor universal (in that it excluded unmarried and younger women who
had to wait until 1928 to get the vote).
6 Klomp and De Haan (2013a) have recently challengedwhether it is appropriate to re-
strict the coefﬁcient on the election cycle indicator to be homogenous across countries. As
with other studies that make use of local government data, e.g., Veiga and Veiga (2007),
our study is less open to this critique because the institutional and economic environment
is broadly the same across the LMBs.
7 Heckelman andWhaples (1996) is the only other studywe are aware of which inves-
tigates the political business cycle (in GDP in the USA) from a historical perspective.documented by Aidt et al. (2010), this generated a negative relationship
between spending on local public goods and the extension of the fran-
chise.8 We add to this by studying how opportunistic political budget
cycles operate in an environment with taxpayer-voters. This restricted
franchise is compared to the regime of universal suffrage, where the
pivotal voter often does not contribute much to the local tax base.
Secondly, our study contributes to the fast expanding research on
the conditional political budget cycle initiated by Persson and Tabellini
(2003), Brender and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson (2006), Alt and
Lassen (2006a,b) and Alt and Rose (2007) amongst others, and recently
surveyed by de Haan and Klomp (2013). The general point here is that
the size and nature of the political budget cycle are conditional on the
political and economic environment. They depend, amongst other fac-
tors, on economic conditions (e.g., the level of income), the institutional
framework (e.g., the level of corruption, the type of election or political
system), and the monitoring framework (e.g., ﬁscal transparency and
quality of the press). We add an important dimension to this condition-
ality by showing that the opportunistic political budget cycle is inﬂu-
enced by the details of the franchise.
Weﬁnd the following results. Under taxpayer suffrage (1902–1914),
the opportunistic political budget cycle materializes as tax cuts and in
reduced spending on administration in election years. Under universal
suffrage (1921–1937), we ﬁnd that expenditures in election years are
shifted towards productive public goods (capital spending) and away
from other types of (current) spending, with no effect on tax income.
The LMBs operated under a balanced budget rule which limited their
ability to deﬁcit ﬁnance election year tax cuts or spending booms, yet
we ﬁnd evidence of smaller surpluses in election years under both suf-
frage regimes.
We interpret these ﬁndings in the light of the different incentives
that variations in the suffrage rules generate for politicians to engineer
opportunistic cycles. Building on Lohmann (1998), Shi and Svensson
(2006), and Aidt et al. (2010), we provide a formal rational choice
model that illustrates the logic. Under a restricted taxpayer suffrage
that explicitly disenfranchises non-taxpayers and enfranchises owners
of property in the locality who can reside elsewhere, taxpayer-voters
often demand retrenchment and economy. Politicians respond to this
by cutting taxes and reducing spending on administration in election
years, as we observe in the data. In contrast, under universal suffrage
all adult residents hold the right to vote, including many poorer resi-
dents who contribute little in terms of property tax payments to
the funding of spending. This generates demand for ﬁscal expansion.
Politicians, therefore, aim to engineer additional electoral support by
adjusting the portfolio of spending towards productive public services
which beneﬁt the pivotal voter and away from other spending without
necessarily increasing taxes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we intro-
duce the institutional setting of our study and the particularities of the
suffrage rules governing elections to the councils of the LMBs before
and after the First World War. In Section 3, we develop the theoretical
foundation for our empirical investigation. To this end, we sketch a ra-
tional choice model and provide an online supplementary appendix
with technical details. In Section 4, we present the data and discuss
some stylized facts about local public ﬁnance in London between 1902
and 1937. In Section 5, we consider the evidence of an opportunistic po-
litical budget cycle. In Section 6, we lay out our empirical strategy. We
present themain ﬁndings in Section 7 and in Section 8we discuss alter-
native interpretations and robustness checks. The concluding remarks
in Section 9 recapitulate our ﬁndings in the context of conditional polit-
ical budget cycles.8 For a discussion of under-investment in the urban amenities and infrastructure during
the 19th century, seeWilliamson (1990). The life expectancy data reported in Szreter and
Mooney (1998) demonstrate that the situation did not improve much until late in the
century.
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The 28 LMBs were established by the London Government Act of
1899 and they took ofﬁce in November 1900 (Robson, 1939, chapter
10; Young and Garside, 1982).9 LMBs were created from the largest of
the existing Vestries and District Boards of Works and by combining
smaller Vestries and Boards into bigger and ﬁscally more viable
units.10 As with the Vestries and District Boards, themain responsibility
of the boroughs was the provision of local urban amenities. This includ-
ed construction and maintenance of local streets, refuse collection, pro-
vision of public lighting (by 1912, 15 LMBs were generating their own
electricity for street lighting), sewers and drainage, burial grounds, li-
braries, parks, baths andwashhouses, and the employment of health of-
ﬁcers. They could also purchase land and build public sector housing
(White, 2001). Other services, such as schools, infectious disease hospi-
tals, policing and major roads and infrastructure projects fell outside
their jurisdiction andwere handled by a variety of city-wide authorities,
but the bulk of spending on sanitation andhealth-related public services
was undertaken by the boroughs.11 The responsibilities stayed constant
over the period from 1901 to 1937 (in fact to the 1960s) and there were
no substantial changes in ﬁscal federalism over the period.12
The main source of LMB revenue was receipts from the rate – the
local property tax – which often contributed around 90% of total in-
come. User charges for speciﬁc services were also important and some
equalization funds were available, though poorer boroughs complained
about the iniquity of the redistribution (Booth, 2009). From this base,
the boroughs provided local public goods and ﬁnanced the administra-
tive cost of running the council. They also collected taxes on behalf of
other local authorities (e.g., the School Board for London, London Coun-
ty Council, the Boards of Guardians, and theMetropolitan Police).With-
in these institutional and ﬁscal constraints, the elected councillors had
freedom to allocate public monies as they saw ﬁt and to raise the tax re-
sources they deemed necessary to fund required expenditures. While
they could borrow funds for the purpose of capital investment, they
were not allowed to do so to ﬁnance current spending and they effec-
tively operated under a balanced budget rule which, however, did not
preclude surpluses.
The LMBs were governed by a council, consisting of a mayor, al-
dermen and councillors.13 These were elected in competitive elec-
tions. Unlike prior to 1901, where elections for the Vestries took place
each year for a third of the vestrymen, all the LMBs adopted an election
cycle in which the entire council was elected every three years.14 The
rules governing the electoral franchise for the LMBs between 1901
and 1918 were codiﬁed in the Local Government Act of 1894. Voters
consisted of two groups of men (and a limited number of widows and9 We exclude from the analysis the City of London, which was a Corporation and
governed by a different set of rules and had access to a particularly large tax base.
10 See Davis (1988, Appendix 4), for the composition of the LMBs.
11 Schoolswere run by the London School Board (whichwas abolished in 1904when the
London County Council assumed responsibility for education), law enforcement was run
by the Metropolitan Police, and London-wide infrastructure projects fell under the juris-
diction of London County Council, established in 1888.
12 We have only been able to detect changes to this arrangement in the collection of the
poor law rate. InMarch 1921, the Labour-run council in the east end borough of Poplar re-
fused to pay precepts to the central London agencies in an attempt to force equalization of
the rates across the capital. Supported by the adjoining boroughs of Bethnal Green and
Stepney, 30 Poplar councilors were jailed for their dissent (Booth, 2009). The outcome
failed to equalize the rates, but instead pooled more outdoor relief through the Common
Poor Fund. Just before theWar, 63% ofmetropolitan guardians' expenditure came through
the Common Poor Fund, a ﬁgurewhich rose to 85% following the east end protests (Gilles-
pie, 1989, p. 180). When the Poor Lawwas abolished, all of its functions were transferred
to the London County Council's Public Assistance Committee in 1929 (Gillespie, 1989, p.
182). We stress that these changes did not inﬂuence the core operations of the LMBs.
13 See Doyle (2000) for a discussion of the local government organization in England and
Wales.
14 This systemwas common to all elected local government bodies in England andWales
throughout the 19th centurywhichmakes it impossible to study the political budget cycle
using British local government data before the establishment of the LMBs.spinsters): the Parochial Electors and the Parliamentary Electors were
entitled to vote under the Parliamentary Reform Act of 1884 and the
Registration Act of 1885 (Keith-Lucas, 1952, p. 233). Both groups were
required to occupy a property in the borough for a sufﬁcient time period
(ranging from 6 to 12 months), but permanent residence in the bor-
ough was not necessary. Some boroughs, therefore, had a signiﬁcant
number of absentee voters. Most importantly, however, eligibility to
vote for the council was linked directly to payment of the rate. Provided
that the occupancy requirementwas satisﬁed, the right to votewas con-
ferred on occupiers of property worth at least £10 and had been subject
to 12 months' ratingwith the rate paid in full. This implied that the right
to vote was restricted to the taxpayers of the borough who had paid
their dues on time and in full. This disenfranchised many poorer inhab-
itants. Since the fraction of the total stock of property rated in each bor-
ough varied (slum areaswere sometimes not rated) as did the diligence
of tax collection, the fraction ofmales aged 20 and above that could vote
varied greatly. In 1909, for example, about 37% of adultmales in Stepney
and 78% of adult males in Battersea were eligible.15 The average exten-
sion of the franchise across the boroughs between 1902 and 1914 was
about 60%. We refer to this as the taxpayer suffrage.
Taxpayer suffragewas abolished by the Representation of the People
Act of 1918which established one standard franchise for all general and
local elections in Great Britain. For men the requirement was six
months' occupation of land or premises in the area (i.e., no tax payment
requirement). The condition for women was six months' occupation of
land or premises in the area or as the wife of a man so qualiﬁed, on ac-
count of premises in which they both resided, if she was 30 years old
(Keith-Lucas, 1952, p. 235). The Act also abolished the disenfranchise-
ment of paupers for all local government purposes. While owners of
land or buildings within the borough previously were entitled to vote
whether they lived in the borough or not, after 1918 they qualiﬁed to
be elected as a borough councillor, but not to vote. Although some
women had to wait until 1928 to get the right to vote, we refer to this
post-1918 situation as universal suffrage.
3. The budget cycle and the suffrage: a theoretical framework
We consider a borough populated by capitalists (C) and workers (L)
during two periods, t= 1,2. Each capitalist is endowed with capital (k)
and two units of housing.Workers are endowedwith one unit of labour,
which is supplied in-elastically to a competitive labour market, and
nothing else. There are nc capitalists and more workers than that. Each
period, the capitalists combine their capital endowment with hired la-
bour to produce output using a CRTS technology. The market clearing
wage and proﬁt income, wt⁎ and πt⁎, are both strictly increasing in total
factor productivity. The capitalists “consume” one unit of housing pri-
vately and pay the property tax levied on it directly. The other unit is
supplied to a competitive market as rental accommodation for workers.
Under the assumption that the supply of houses is ﬁxed, the incidence
of the property tax levied on rented accommodation, if any, falls on
the capitalists and workers therefore do not pay the local property tax.
An elected council determines the borough's ﬁscal affairs. An elec-
tion takes place between the two periods. We assume that the council
is run by a capitalist-politician who is rewarded with an exogenous
per-period ego-rentM and endogenous rents, rt, extracted by diverting
tax revenues to private income with rt ≤ r⁎. The tasks of the capitalist-
politician are to provide productive and non-productive public goods
and to raise the funds needed through property taxation. The produc-
tive public good, gt, makes the borough economy more productive and
wages and proﬁts are strictly increasing and concave functions of gt.
The non-productive public good, qt, only beneﬁts capitalists (property
owners) and is a normal good. All this is ﬁnanced by the local property15 Thesepercentages are calculated by dividing thenumber of eligible voters (taken from
London Statistics 1909–10, vol. XX, pp. 24–30) by the male population over the age of 20
(taken from the 1911 census).
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τt ¼
rt þ qt þ gt
2nc
; ð1Þ
where the tax base is 2nc because each capitalist owns two units
of housing. Residents' wellbeing depends on three factors: the budget
allocation, the quality of the politician running the council, and random
events (luck). The utility generated by the budget allocation (and con-
sumption of private goods) is
vC qt ; gt ; rtð Þ ≡ uC p; qt ;π gtð Þ−
rt þ gt þ qt
nC
 
ð2Þ
vL gtð Þ≡ uL p;w gtð Þ
  ð3Þ
where uC and uL are standard indirect utility functions deﬁned over
the price of the private good (p), the non-productive public good (for cap-
italists) and income, which in the case of capitalists is net of the property
tax needed to balance the budget. All residents beneﬁt from the produc-
tive public good because it increases wage and proﬁt income. Workers
want as much of this good provided as possible. Taxpaying capitalists
face a trade-off between the higher proﬁts earned in a more productive
economy and the utility they get from the non-productive good and the
cost of paying the necessary taxes. They view rents as waste and want
this cut to zero. The per-period utility of a capitalist-politician is
SC qt ; gt ; rtð Þ≡ uC p; qt ;π gtð Þ−
rt þ gt þ qt
nC
þ rt
 
ð4Þ
which we notice is increasing in the rent. While all capitalist-politicians
share this objective function and care about re-election, they differ
with regard to “quality”. Quality matters for residents because the
utility they get from a given budget allocation increases with the
quality of the incumbent politician. The total utility of capitalists
and workers is
VCt ¼ vC qt ; gt ; rtð Þ þ ηt þ μt ð5Þ
VLt ¼ vL gtð Þ þ ηt þ μt ; ð6Þ
where ηt is the quality shock, which determines how competent the
incumbent is, and μt is a “luck” shock that may make him look more
(or less) competent than may be the case.The fundamental informa-
tion assumption of the model is that voters observe total utility but
are unable to decompose this into the three sub-components before
the election. The model captures the notion that voters, typically, are
ill-informed about the ﬁner details of local public ﬁnance; or if they
do know, they cannot (except at equilibrium) say for sure if the wel-
fare they derive from the budget policy is due to the policy itself or to
other factors such as the quality of the politician or simply to luck.16
While the two shocks are unobserved, they are drawn from known
normal distributions with zero mean and variance ση2 and σμ2, respec-
tively. The “luck” shock is drawn independently each period. The
competency shock is an attribute of a politician and, if the incumbent
capitalist-politician is re-elected, then the competency shock from
period 1 also applies to period 2. A new capitalist-politician elected
for period 2 is associated with a new draw. This information16 This is analogous to the assumption in Lohmann (1998) that voters do not observe
monetary policy (and inﬂation) until after the election. Alternatively, we could, as do Shi
and Svensson (2006), assume that voters observe some budget components but not all
of them.structure introduces a moral hazard element which is the source of
the rational political budget cycle. The suffrage rules determine
who can vote in the election at the end of period 1. Under taxpayer
suffrage (TS), only the owners of property, i.e., capitalists, can vote.
In contrast, under universal suffrage (US), all residents can vote
and the pivotal voter is a worker. In both suffrage regimes, the timing
of events is:
1. At the beginning of period 1, a balanced budget {g1,q1,r1} is imple-
mented by the incumbent capitalist-politician.
2. The two random shocks η1 and μ1 are realized but not observed di-
rectly by anyone.
3. Total utility is determined and observed by all residents.
4. At the end of the period, the election takes place. Thosewith the right
to vote either re-elect the incumbent capitalist-politician or elect a
“new” capitalist-politician.
5. The winner implements a balanced budget {g2,q2,r2} for period 2.
6. The “luck” shock, μ2, is realized. If the politician is “new”, the com-
petency shock, η2, is realized. If the incumbent politician was re-
elected, the competency shock from period 1 (η1) carries over to
period 2.
7. Total utility is determined and observed by all residents.
In period 2, the capitalist-politician implements the balanced budget
policy that maximizes SC(q2,g2,r2) subject to r2≤ r*.17 The optimal post-
election budget is {g*,q*,r*} with τ ¼ gþqþr2nC . The level of productive
public goods g⁎maximizes proﬁt income net of the tax cost for a repre-
sentative capitalist but the level of the non-productive public good is
higher than capitalist-voters want because the capitalist-politician en-
riches himself with the maximum rent (r⁎) and q is a normal good. In
period 1, to improve his re-election prospects, the incumbent must in-
crease the likelihood of appearing competent by delivering extra utility
to the appropriate group of voters. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the “utility target”
which the incumbent wants to “engineer” in the quest for re-election
under each suffrage regime. Given these “utility targets”, we character-
ize the underlying pre-election budget policy. The derivation of the
“utility targets” is formally similar to the analysis of Lohmann (1998).
Intuitively, voters want to re-elect an incumbent of above average qual-
ity, but neither they nor the incumbent observes the quality shock η1
directly. Voters do, however, observe their total utility and they
know the equilibrium budget choice of the incumbent. By solving the
resulting signal extraction problem, they arrive at a Bayesian estimate
of the incumbent's quality. They can, then, adopt a rational retrospective
voting rule which re-elects the incumbent if and only if total utility is
above a threshold. This, in turn, provides the incumbent with an incen-
tive to engineer a pre-election increase in the utility of the pivotal voters
in the knowledge that thiswill make him appear competent.We denote
the resulting “utility targets” UTS and UUS and note that UTS N vC(g*,q*,r*)
andUUS N vL(g*). Given the “utility targets”, the equilibriumpre-election
budget maximizes SC(g1,q1,r1) subject to r1 ≤ r* and to the relevant re-
election constraint. Under taxpayer suffrage, the re-election constraint
is vC(g1,q1,r1) ≥ UTS and under universal suffrage it is vL(g1) ≥ UUS.
Proposition 1. The capitalist-politician generates a rational political
budget cycle.
1. Taxpayer suffrage: the pre-election budget is rTS b r*, gTS= g*, qTS b q*
and τTS b τ*.
2. Universal suffrage: the pre-election budget is rUS = r*, gUS N g*, qTS b
q* and τTS
≥
b
τ.
The capitalist-politicianwantsmore rents andmore spending on the
non-productive public good than do capitalist-voters. Under taxpayer
suffrage, the capitalist-politician cuts spending on the non-productive
public good and rents to convince capitalist-voters of his quality. Since17 The online supplementary appendix provides all proofs.
Table 1
The London Metropolitan Boroughs.
Name ID number Name ID number
Battersea 1 Islington 16
Bermondsey 2 Kensington 17
Bethnal Green 3 Lambeth 18
Camberwell 4 Lewisham 19
Chelsea 5 Paddington 20
City of Westminster 7 Poplar 21
Deptford 8 Shoreditch 22
Finsbury 9 Southwark 23
Fulham 10 St. Marylebone 24
Greenwich 11 St. Pancras 25
Hackney 12 Stepney 26
Hammersmith 13 Stoke Newington 27
Hampstead 14 Wandsworth 28
Holborn 15 Woolwich 29
Note: The City of London, which was not a Metropolitan Borough, is not included in the
analysis. It has the ID number 6 and is shaded white in all the maps.
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there is no pre-election distortion in that item. The combined conse-
quence is that the tax rate falls. In short, the rational political budget
cycle manifests itself as pre-election cuts in rents, less spending on
non-productive public goods and lower taxes.We call this the retrench-
ment hypothesis.
Under universal suffrage, worker-voters wantmore spending on the
productive public good than the capitalist-politician. They are not con-
cerned with the other budget items because the incidence of the prop-
erty tax is passed on and because they do not beneﬁt from non-
productive public goods. Consequently, the capitalist-politician delivers
the utility target UUS by spending more on the productive public good.
The maximum rent is then extracted and spending on the non-
productive public good is cut. The reason for the latter is that the in-
crease in spending on g decreases net proﬁt income, making it optimal
to reduce spending on q. The net effect on the tax rate is ambiguous.
In short, under universal suffrage the rational political budget cycle
manifests itself as a pre-election hike in spending on productive public
goods and a cut in non-productive services, with an uncertain effect
on taxes. We call this the expenditure switching hypothesis.
The LMBs could not run deﬁcits but surpluses could be accumulated
for precautionary reasons.18 We can capture this by assuming that the
incumbent politician has a surplus target in non-election years but
may deviate from this in election years (at a cost). Under taxpayer suf-
frage, the beneﬁt is thatmore rents can be retained. Under universal suf-
frage, some of the increase in spending on productive public goods can
be ﬁnanced by suspending the surplus target. Surpluses may, therefore,
be lower in election than in non-election years irrespective of the suf-
frage rules. This is the third hypothesis we test.19 A laggeddependent variable is included in the estimations,whichmeans that one year4. Data
Table 1 lists the 28 London Metropolitan Boroughs and the ID
number used to identify each of them in the maps shown below. In-
formation on the LMBs' accounts is published in the Local Taxation
Returns (1901–1914) and in the Local Government Financial Statis-
tics (1920–1938). These sources contain detailed information on in-
come, expenditures (current and capital) and debt for each borough.
The format of the accounts, however, changed signiﬁcantly after the
FirstWorldWar, when the responsibility for collecting and reporting
local government public ﬁnance data moved from the Local Govern-
ment Board to theMinistry of Health. After this change, a greater em-
phasis was put on recording information related to public health.
This makes it impossible to match disaggregated budget items between
the two sources and we consider two separate samples, corresponding
to the two suffrage regimes. We stress, however, that a careful reading
of the notes to the accounts gives us no reason to believe that there
were any substantial alterations to LMB accounting practises that
could account for systematic differences in the nature of the political
budget cycle before and after the change in suffrage rules.
The ﬁscal year runs from April 1 toMarch 31 throughout andwe use
the convention to refer to a ﬁscal year by the calendar year in which it
ends. The taxpayer suffrage sample runs from 1902 to 1914. We cannot
use the data for 1901 because the accounts only refer to a part of the
year (November 1900 to March 1901) and 1914 is the last ﬁscal year
available since systematic reporting was suspended during much of
the War. The ﬁrst accounts after the War for the ﬁscal year 1920 were
incomplete and are excluded from the analysis. The universal suffrage
sample, therefore, starts with the ﬁscal year ending in 1921 and runs
to 1937. This gives a total of 364 observations for the taxpayer suffrage18 It is, however, oftenpossible to circumvent budget rules, see, e.g., Rose (2006) or Veiga
and Veiga (2007).sample and 476 for the universal suffrage sample.19 The ﬁscal data is
converted into real values using the Sauerbeck-Statisk price index
from Mitchell (1988) with base year 1871 and expressed in per 1000
capita terms. The seven particular ﬁscal outcomes that we study are
listed and deﬁned in Table 2.
Elections took place every three years: 1900, 1903, 1906, 1909 and
1912 before the War; and 1919, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934, and
1937 after. The potentialmanipulation of the budgetwould occur before
the election and would therefore fall in the ﬁscal year spanning the No-
vember election. We deﬁne the dummy variable election as being equal
to one if ﬁscal year t is an election year and zero otherwise.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics separately for the two samples
and Figs. 1–6 show the average trends for the ﬁscal outcome variables
for the ﬁscal years 1902–14 and 1921–37, respectively. We notice a
number of important facts. First, both current income and current expen-
diture increase in real terms from around £15 per 1000 capita (in 1871
prices) under taxpayer suffrage to £25 per 1000 capita under universal
suffrage (see Table 3). The increase in capital expenditure (and capital in-
come) is less pronounced. Secondly, there were no particular trends in
current expenditure or in spending on administration under taxpayer suf-
frage (Fig. 1). Likewise, current income and rate income are stable in this
period (Fig. 2). A similar characterization applies to the trends under
universal suffrage (Figs. 4 and 5) and we note that, on average, the
LMBs' spending and taxation levels were comparable in 1914 and
1921, despite the interruption of the War and the franchise change.
We do, however, observe a decline in capital expenditure (and capital
income) under taxpayer suffrage in the years before the War (Figs. 1
and 2). The spike in capital expenditure in 1905 is entirely attributed to
a large investment in electricity in St. Marylebone and is (more than)
matched by a large increase in capital income (a big loan). Thirdly,
around 1930, a marked level shift upwards in current expenditure and
in rate income but not in capital expenditure, takes place. A disaggregated
analysis of the data [not reported] suggests that this reﬂects increases in
spending on streets as well as increases in wage costs. Gillespie (1989)
documents how some boroughs in the 1920s used resources for public
relief work and we conjecture that this endeavour was intensiﬁed dur-
ing the recession years. Fourthly, we observe substantial year-on-year
variation in the average current deﬁcit (Figs. 3 and 6). Mostly the LMBs
were close to balancing the books and, on average, they ran a smallof observations is lost and the respective sample sizes used in the regressions are 336 and
448. The detailed accounts for the ﬁscal year ending 1922were only published in abbrevi-
ated format and some of the disaggregated data is missing for 1922. For these items, the
universal suffrage sample is further reduced by two years and contains 392 observations.
Abbreviated accounts were published in 1922 because the Ministry of Health was short-
staffed.
20 The relevant census years are 1901, 1911, 1921, and 1931. The planned census of 1941
was not carried out because of the SecondWorld War. We interpolated linearly between
the census dates.
21 The data on rateable values are recorded in the Local Taxation Returns (1901–1914)
and in the Local Government Financial Statistics (1918–1938). The nominal data are de-
ﬂated by the Sauerbeck-Statisk price index. FromTable 3,we note a fall in real rateable val-
ue per 1000 houses after theWar. The fall can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, nominal
valuations did not increase at the same speed as theprice index in the early interwar years.
Secondly, theworking class houses built after theWarwere valued below average, if at all.
Table 2
Deﬁnitions of the eight ﬁscal outcome variables.
Variable name Deﬁnition
Taxpayer suffrage
Deﬁnition
Universal suffrage
Current income Receipts from the rates, user charges and grants other than from loans, net of
payments under precepta to other local authorities.
Annual income of the rate fund and general services, net of payments
under precept.
Capital income Receipts from loans. Capital receipts (including loans) for the rate fund and general services
maintained by the borough council.
Rate incomeb Receipts from general and other rates including funds raised to meet precept. Income from public rates (general and other) including funds raised
to meet precepts.
Current expenditure Spending on services such as streets, refuse collection, public lighting, sewers and
drainage, public works, burial grounds, baths and washhouses, loan charges
and salaries & administration, excluding payments under precept to other local
authorities.
Annual expenditure on general services (the same type of spending
as under taxpayer suffrage).
Capital expenditure Investments on depots and refuse, made under the electricity act, on streets, on
housing, on parks, on public buildings, on sewerage and drainage, on baths and
washhouses, and on public libraries.
Capital expenditures on general services (the same type of investments
as under taxpayer suffrage).
Administrationb Current expenditure on spending on salaries and other remuneration of ofﬁcers
and establishment charges.c
Spending on medical ofﬁcers, total administrative expenses and rate
collection expenses.
Deﬁcit Current expenditure minus current income. Current expenditure minus current income.
Note:
a Precept is the tax payment collected by the council for other local authorities (the Boards of Guardians, London County Council, the School Board for London and the Metropolitan
Police).
b For the universal suffrage sample the data are available from 1923.
c Many administrative expenses were allocated directly to the services that they helped provide and cannot be separated out.
Source: The Local Taxation Returns (1901–1914) and the Local Government Financial Statistics (1918–1938).
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable name Average Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Average Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
1902–1914 1921–1937
Current income 15.08 7.01 4.42 49.49 25.28 13.34 4.99 79.83
Capital income 3.00 8.69 0 155.58 5.17 8.13 0 55.31
Rate income 40.54 25.18 17.12 164.61 67.74 63.62 11.71 434.22
Current expenditure 15.01 6.84 5.73 49.83 25.04 13.13 4.93 79.46
Capital expenditure 3.11 8.39 0 149.87 5.23 7.85 0 50.11
Administration 1.60 0.64 0.69 4.17 3.41 2.04 0.59 11.59
Deﬁcit −0.21 1.41 −6.98 8.78 −0.24 2.05 −12.77 13.32
Population 160,829 75,342 47,508 334,232 160,025 97,528 34,850 901,000
Population growth −47 1724 −3015 7936 601 11,264 −3666 96,534
Population density 14.15 2.07 8.56 19.83 16.64 2.21 4.84 21.32
Age structure 37.87 5.47 24.89 46.53 32.41 5.61 20.47 43.68
Wealth 843.60 618.44 329.29 4053.25 735.42 774.63 214.06 5566.17
Debt 34.73 34.36 5.28 235.93 66.77 67.99 2.87 374.79
Franchise extension 61.7 8.8 36.3 81.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Left 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.29 0.45 0 1
Absent owners 1190 610 199 3283 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: See Table 2 and the text for deﬁnitions of the variables. All ﬁscal variables are in real 1871 Pounds per 1000 capita.
58 T.S. Aidt, G. Mooney / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 53–71surplus both before and after the change in the franchise (see Table 3).
This suggests that the balanced budget rule mattered, but, at the same
time, allowed some ﬂexibility for ﬁscal manipulations.
The average trends hide substantial cross sectional variation: some
boroughs spent, taxed and borrowed much more than others. The dis-
persion is particularly large with regard to capital expenditures (and in-
come) where the standard deviation is about twice as large as themean
values (see Table 3).We visualize this dispersion inMaps 1–3. Eachmap
consists of two panels, one for the pre-war and for the post-war period,
and colour codes the spatial distribution of rate income (Map 1), current
expenditure (Map 2) and capital expenditure (Map 3). There is a consis-
tent spatial pattern of high-tax–high-current-spending in north-west
London, including Westminster, Holborn, St. Marylebone, and Hamp-
stead, and Woolwich in the south-east. These are also the areas with
high levels of capital expenditure under taxpayer suffrage. After the
change to universal suffrage in 1918 there is amarked shift in capital ex-
penditure to the east and south-east of London, with Poplar, Bermond-
sey and Greenwich standing out as big spenders. Much political
debate was generated after the First World War about the high-rating
and -spending policies of east end Labour councils such as Poplar.
Leaders of the Labour Party in London were worried that this approachwould alienate potential middle-class support in other parts of the cap-
ital (Gillespie, 1989).
We also collect demographic data – total population, population
growth (absolute change in number of inhabitants), population density
(inhabitants per house) and age structure (proportion of the population
below 20) – from the decennial Censuses.20 We do not have income or
GDP data for the boroughs, but we record the average value of proper-
ties subject to taxation in each borough each year and use the variable
wealth (deﬁned as taxable value per 1000 houses) to proxy for income
or wealth effects.21 We record information on the stock of outstanding
loans at the end of each ﬁscal year and use the variable debt (deﬁned
as outstanding real debt per capita), as a proxy for accumulated
22 Thewages of direct-labour employees were a particularly contentious topic inmetro-
politan politics. Gillespie (1989, p. 170) notes that “Labour-controlled councils awarded
minimumwages considerably in excess of trade union rates”. Such policies became a tar-
get for the Municipal Reformers, who sought to reduce these sorts of expenditures and
keep a ﬁrm lid on the rates.
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we have collected information on the number of registered voters in
each borough. We normalize this with the size of the adult male popu-
lation to get the variable franchise extensionwhich we use to control for
variations in the size of the electorate. We have collected a number of
additional variables used for robustness checks. We introduce these in
Section 8.
5. Evidence for the political budget cycle
The ﬁscal outcome variables deﬁned in Table 2 are selected to facil-
itate tests of the retrenchment and expenditure switching hypotheses.
Retrenchment effects would primarily show up as election year tax
cuts. This is captured by rate income and current incomewhere the latter,
in addition to property tax revenue, includes income from user charges
for local public services, but excludes revenues raised on behalf of
other local authorities. Expenditure switching involves increasing
spending on productive public goods that beneﬁts all and cuts in non-
productive spending.We presume that the outputs generated by capital
expenditures represent productive public spending. In contrast, many
current spending items are non-productive. Therefore, we use the vari-
ables capital expenditure and current expenditure to test the expenditure
switching hypothesis. In addition, we use the variable capital income to
test if there is a tendency to take out loans in election years. If this is the
case, the need to increase the yield from property taxes to fund the pre-
election spending hike in capital spending anticipated under universal
suffrage would be reduced and we might expect to see a fall in taxincome tomatch the expected fall in current spending.We use expendi-
ture on administration as a proxy for bureaucratic spendingwith the ra-
tionale that the taxpayer-voter might ﬁnd such outlays particularly
wasteful.22 Finally, we use current deﬁcit, deﬁned as total current expen-
ditureminus current income, to test election cycles in the ﬁscal balance.
Beforewe turn to the formal statistical analysis,we present somede-
scriptive evidence on the nature of the opportunistic political budget
cycle in London between 1902 and 1937. Figs. 7–10 show plots of the
seven ﬁscal outcome variables in “event time”. That is, each ﬁgure
shows the average of the relevant ﬁscal outcome in election years, one
year before an election and one year after an election. A “V” or an
inverted “V” shape indicates a political budget cycle. We observe a
clear revenue pattern under taxpayer suffrage: lower current income
and lower rate income in election years than in other years (Fig. 7).
We note a fall in spending for both administration and current expendi-
ture (Fig. 8). The pattern is noticeably different under universal suffrage
(Figs. 9 and 10). The budget cycle in rate income has gone. Instead, we
observe a clear election year increase in capital expenditure with a hint
of a cycle in current income. Under both franchise regimes, surpluses
are lower in election years.
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60 T.S. Aidt, G. Mooney / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 53–71Altogether, it appears that the political budget cycle differed before
and after the expansion of the franchise in ways that are consistent
with the retrenchment and expenditure switching hypotheses. It is
clear, of course, that many other factors than the differences in the suf-
frage rules could be behind this, including the political ideology of the
councils' governing parties and macro-economic trends such as the
Great Depression. We consider these and other potential inﬂuences in
a later section. First, however, we turn to a systematic analysis of the
data.
6. Empirical speciﬁcation
As in Brender and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson (2006), Veiga
and Veiga (2007) and many other studies of the political budget cycle,
we estimate a partial adjustment model of the following type:
Yit ¼ αi þ β1Yit−1 þ β2electiont þ Xitγ þ ϵit ; ð7Þ
where Yit is a particular ﬁscal outcome in year t in borough i, electiont is
the election year dummy variable, and ϵit is an error term. The vector Xit
contains the demographic control variables (population, population
growth, population density and age structure) and the proxy for income,
wealth. In addition, for speciﬁcations where the outcome variable is a
spending item, we control for the stock of outstanding loans in order
to proxy for past investments (debt). For the purpose of analysing the
taxpayer suffrage sample, we include the measure of the fraction of
adult males who were registered as voters (franchise extension). We in-
clude borough ﬁxed effects to capture time invariant characteristics of
the boroughs.23 The timing of the elections is exogenous so we need
not worry about the endogeneity of elections or that the timing might
be chosen strategically to win elections. As already noted, we study
the two suffrage regimes separately as two different samples and thus
allow β2 (along with all the other parameters of the model) to vary
with the suffrage regime.
In an attempt to balance various econometric issues with the data at
hand, our model uses two different estimators. The ﬁrst is a ﬁxed effect
estimator. We cluster the standard errors at the borough level to take
into account the fact that autocorrelation in a ﬁxed effectmodelmay in-
ﬂate the z-statistics and cause invalid inference (Bertrand et al., 2004).
The lagged dependent variable may, however, cause a Nickell bias
(Nickell, 1981), since our two samples have only 12 and 16 years of ob-
servations, respectively.24 Our second estimator takes this into account.23 Since elections take place at the same time in all boroughs, we cannot include time
ﬁxed effects. For a rare study of local elections where the election year effect can be sepa-
rated from common time effects, see Bambang et al. (2013).
24 Judson and Owen (1999) show that the bias is negligible for panels that cover more
than 20 years.The GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) used by, e.g., Shi and
Svensson (2006), is not ideal in our case as it requires many more
cross sectional units to yield consistent estimates than we obtained.
For this reason,we use thebias-corrected least-squares dummyvariable
(LSDV) estimator. It performs better than the GMM estimator in panels
with a small cross section (Bruno, 2005a,b).7. Results
The main results for the taxpayer suffrage sample are recorded in
Table 4 (revenue outcomes) and Table 5 (expenditure outcomes). The
corresponding results for the universal suffrage sample are reported in
Tables 6 and 7. For eachﬁscal outcome,we report both the estimates ob-
tainedwith the ﬁxed effects and the LSDVestimator, whichmostly yield
similar results for the election year indicator variable. We ﬁnd strong
evidence of an opportunistic political budget cycle in both samples but
the nature of the cycle is conditional on the suffrage rules.
Under taxpayer suffrage, the political budget cycle shows up as a re-
duction in current income and in rate income in the election year
(Table 4). Spending on administration is cut in election years. There is
no detectable impact on the relative composition of capital and current
spending (Table 5). The cut in administration is insufﬁcient to balance
the books andwe ﬁnd that election years are associatedwith lower sur-
pluses (Table 4). In other words, the election year tax cut is partly
funded by cutting back on bureaucracy and partly by running a smaller
surplus (or a small “unplanned” deﬁcit). The magnitude of the tax cut
is about £0.6 per 1000 capita which should be compared to the total
income (net of precept) of £15 per 1000 capita. The reduction in admin-
istration corresponds to about a 1.5 per cent cut in the election year.
These are sizable effects which are consistent with the retrenchment
hypothesis.
We observe a different pattern under universal suffrage. Most nota-
ble are election year increases in capital expenditure and reductions in
current expenditures (Table 7). The increase in capital expenditure is
£0.93 per 1000 capita with the average capital expenditure being about
£5.2 per 1000 capita. The reduction in current expenditure is somewhat
smaller (£0.55 per 1000 capita with average expenditure being £25).
This suggests that the LMBs systematically moved large-scale capital
projects to the election year, while cutting back on current spending.
On the revenue side, we ﬁnd no evidence of a political budget cycle in
tax income or in capital income. There was an election year drop, howev-
er, in current income (Table 6) and a tendency to run smaller surpluses
or larger deﬁcits in election years. Since rate income is unaffected, the
fall in current income can be attributed to election year reductions in
user chargers. These ﬁndings are consistent with the expenditure
switching hypothesis.
a) 1902-14 
b) 1921-37 
Map 1. Rate income (£ per 1000 capita) in London Metropolitan Boroughs before and after World War I.
61T.S. Aidt, G. Mooney / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 53–71The estimations yield some additional results which are of indepen-
dent interest. Firstly, the variable wealth is positively related to current
spending and revenues in both samples. This is consistent with
Wagner's Law that relates the size of government to income andwealth
(Wagner, 1883). Secondly, insofar as the variable population captures
scale effects, we notice that the negative point estimate on this variable
in the estimations with current (and sometimes also with capital) ex-
penditure is consistent with decreasing returns to scale in the produc-
tion of these services. Millward and Sheard (1995), in their study of
the local ﬁnances of 25 provincial municipalities in England and Wales
from 1870 to 1914, also ﬁnd evidence of (moderate) diminishing
returns. Population growth correlates negatively with revenue andexpenditure outcomes, but is only signiﬁcant in the universal suffrage
sample. In the taxpayer suffrage sample, we control for the size of the
electorate with the variable franchise extension. The boroughswhich ex-
perienced an extension of the suffrage (due, for example, to changes in
the fraction of property rated for tax purposes) tended to collect more
tax income and to run smaller surpluses (Table 4).8. Robustness checks
In this section, we discuss a number of robustness checks and evalu-
ate some alternative interpretations of our ﬁndings.
b) 1921-37 
a) 1902-14 
Map 2. Current expenditure (£ per 1000 capita) in London Metropolitan Boroughs before and after World War I.
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The opportunistic political budget cycles that we have emphasised
above do not make a distinction between the ideologies of the political
parties in power but simply assume that all parties are primarily inter-
ested in getting re-elected. There exists, however, a well-established lit-
erature, beginning with the classical work by Hibbs (1977), Chappell
and Keech (1986), and Alesina (1987), which takes the view that parti-
san cycles in economic and ﬁscal outcomes can emerge because partieshave different views on appropriate policies and their hold on power
ﬂuctuates. In the context of budget cycles, the relevant distinction is be-
tweenparties on the leftwhich support higher spending and,with a bal-
anced budget rule, higher taxes; and parties on the right which support
lower spending and taxation. Both before and after the FirstWorldWar,
elections in London were fought along partisan lines (White, 2001). Be-
fore the War, the Progressive Party and the Moderate Party were the
two dominant parties in local elections in London. At the time, the Pro-
gressive Party consisted of a mixture of Liberals, Fabian socialists and
b) 1921-37 
a) 1902-14 
Map 3. Capital expenditure (£ per 1000 capita) in London Metropolitan Boroughs before and after World War I.
25 We draw on data on the number of seats won by each registered party in each LMB
election reported in Willis et al. (2000). We code left based on an analysis of seat shares.
63T.S. Aidt, G. Mooney / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 53–71radicals and it generally favoured high (local) government spending.
TheModerate Party and, from 1906, TheMunicipal Reform Party, creat-
ed by Conservatives and Unionists, were the dominant right-wing
parties. The political landscape changed after the First World War
with the increased prominence of the Labour Party. This undoubtedly
had its source in the Representation of the People Act of 1918which en-
franchised the working-class and gave it a strong voter base. Conse-
quently, the Labour Party replaced the Progressive Party as the
dominant left-wing party. The right-wing opposition formed a secret
anti-Labour pact in 1922 in response to the popularity of the Labour
Party in the ﬁrst election after the War.
To investigate whether partisan cycles were important, we code the
dummy variable left for years in which a notionally left-wing party (theModerate Party, the Labour Party or, in one case, the Socialist Party)
holds the majority in the borough council and zero otherwise.25 We
conjecture that, if anything, spending and taxation levels should be
higher during the term of a left-wing party. The results are reported in
Panel A of Tables 8 and 9 for the taxpayer suffrage anduniversal suffrage
sample, respectively. The variable left is not signiﬁcant except for one of
the ﬁscal outcomes: for the taxpayer suffrage sample, left has a positive
effect on current expenditures (at the 10 per cent level of signiﬁcance).
The evidence for partisan cycles is clearly weak, justifying our focus on
opportunistic cycles. Importantly, controlling for ideology does not
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Fig. 7. The PBC in revenue outcomes, 1902–1914.
64 T.S. Aidt, G. Mooney / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 53–71affect the evidence for opportunistic cycles at all: the rise of the Labour
Party after the FirstWorldWar cannot by itself explain the observed dif-
ference in the opportunistic political budget cycle.
8.2. Absentee owners
Under taxpayer suffrage, owners of rated property in a borough
were eligible to vote even if they did not reside in that borough. These
absentee voters did not enjoy the beneﬁts of better local public services
to the same extent as resident voters. Accordingly, they might have
been particularly inclined to support retrenchment and economy. It is,14
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Fig. 8. The PBC in expenditurtherefore, possible that variations in the fraction of absentee owners
could by itself affect ﬁscal outcomes under taxpayer suffrage. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have information on the number of absentee
owners/voters, so we use data from the Censuses of 1901, 1911 and
1921 on the number of uninhabited houses as a proxy. The number of
uninhabited houses in the boroughs ranged from 199 to 3283. We
have no way of testing how strong the correlation between empty
property and absentee owners is. Nonetheless we see from Panel B of
Table 8 that the variable absentee owners is insigniﬁcant for all ﬁscal out-
comes and that evidence of the opportunistic political budget cycle is as
before.2.
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The economic climate in the 1930s was very different to that in the
ﬁrst decade of the century and in the 1920s. It is possible, therefore,
that the Great Depression, and not the change from taxpayer to univer-
sal suffrage, could explain the differences in the nature of the budget
cycle that we observe between the two sample periods. It should be
mentioned here that London and the South East fared comparatively
well during the Great Depression (White, 2001). There were pockets
of extremely high unemployment in the capital but the overall24
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Fig. 10. The PBC in expenditurunemployment rate in London was low (Marriott, 1991). As Booth
and Glynn (1975) observed, when national insured unemployment
peaked in 1932 at 22.1%, it was 13.5% in London, 28.5% in the North
East, and 36.5% in Wales. Similarly, Hatton (2003) noted that across
the period 1923–1938, average regional rates of unemployment varied
from 8% in London and the South East to around 22% in parts of Wales
andNorthern Ireland. It is therefore unsurprising thatWhite haswritten
that the “1920s and 1930s consolidated the rise in the standard of life of
the Londonworking class that the FirstWorldWar had so unexpectedly
fan-fared” (White, 2001, p. 226).4
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Table 4
Estimation results for revenue outcomes and current deﬁcit for the taxpayer suffrage sample, 1902–1914.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Current income Current income Capital income Capital income Rate income Rate income Deﬁcit Deﬁcit
Lagged dep. var. 0.41⁎⁎⁎ 0.48⁎⁎⁎ −0.0022 0.099 0.33⁎⁎⁎ 0.38⁎⁎⁎ −0.10⁎⁎ −0.036
[3.18] [9.89] [−0.054] [1.52] [5.32] [7.81] [−2.74] [−0.56]
Election −0.47⁎⁎⁎ −0.51⁎⁎⁎ −1.57 −1.62⁎⁎ −0.50⁎⁎ −0.51⁎⁎ 0.36⁎⁎ 0.38⁎⁎⁎
[−3.24] [−2.74] [−1.30] [−2.06] [−2.56] [−2.23] [2.76] [2.96]
Franchise extension 0.040 0.041 −0.12 −0.11 0.074⁎⁎⁎ 0.080⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.044⁎⁎
[1.53] [1.46] [−1.53] [−0.95] [2.79] [2.22] [2.77] [2.39]
Population growth −0.000060 −0.000078 0.000041 0.000049 −0.000021 −0.000021 0.000056 0.000067
[−0.54] [−0.32] [0.15] [0.048] [−0.075] [−0.067] [0.91] [0.42]
Population −0.000085⁎⁎⁎ −0.000079⁎⁎⁎ 0.000082 0.000082 −0.00010⁎ −0.00010⁎⁎⁎ 4.3e−06 5.0e−06
[−4.70] [−3.13] [0.96] [0.77] [−2.01] [−3.15] [0.32] [0.30]
Age structure −0.099 −0.10 1.24⁎⁎ 1.13 0.35 0.32 0.088 0.081
[−0.48] [−0.42] [2.24] [1.08] [0.93] [1.05] [0.60] [0.51]
Population density 0.69⁎⁎ 0.67⁎⁎⁎ −2.40 −2.38⁎⁎ 3.06⁎⁎⁎ 2.91⁎⁎⁎ 0.045 0.064
[2.16] [2.60] [−1.31] [−2.16] [3.70] [8.49] [0.33] [0.37]
Wealth 0.015⁎⁎⁎ 0.014⁎⁎⁎ −0.017 −0.017⁎⁎ 0.025⁎⁎⁎ 0.025⁎⁎⁎ −0.00016 −0.000093
[6.92] [8.37] [−1.16] [−2.35] [10.5] [11.4] [−0.075] [−0.080]
Estimation method Fixed effectsa LSDVb Fixed effectsa LSDVb Fixed effectsa LSDVb Fixed effectsa LSDVb
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
R-squared 0.45 0.06 0.53 0.08
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Note: All ﬁscal variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita.
a Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough ﬁxed effects included.
b Bias corrected LSDV dynamic panel data estimator suggested by Bruno (2005a,b).
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
66 T.S. Aidt, G. Mooney / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 53–71We recall from Figs. 4 and 5 that current spending and tax income
shift upwards around 1930, suggesting that the depression years trig-
gered a ﬁscal expansion amongst the LMBs. To investigate if the Great
Depression and the associated jump in spending and taxation contribut-
ed to shaping the political budget cycle during the interwar years, we
have re-estimated the model for the universal suffrage sample with
the inclusion of a dummy variable, Great Depression, coded one forTable 5
Estimation results for expenditure outcomes for the taxpayer suffrage sample, 1902–1914.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Current expenditure Current expenditure Capita
Lagged dep. var. 0.23⁎⁎⁎ 0.16⁎⁎⁎ 0.063
[5.34] [3.10] [1.01]
Election −0.039 −0.025 −1.19
[−0.18] [−0.19] [−1.0
Franchise extension 0.0029 −0.0065 −0.12
[0.19] [−0.33] [−1.4
Population growth −0.000038 −0.000062 0.0000
[−0.28] [−0.37] [0.16]
Population −0.000087⁎⁎⁎ −0.000089⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000
[−6.08] [−5.00] [0.80]
Age structure −0.042 −0.051 1.18⁎⁎
[−0.20] [−0.30] [2.09]
Population density 0.48 0.31⁎ −2.63
[1.26] [1.69] [−1.2
Debt 0.063⁎⁎⁎ 0.076⁎⁎⁎ 0.027
[10.4] [9.56] [0.99]
Wealth 0.012⁎⁎⁎ 0.0090⁎⁎⁎ −0.01
[7.54] [7.26] [−1.1
Estimation method Fixed effectsa LSDVb Fixed e
Observations 336 336 336
R-squared 0.65 0.09
Number of boroughs 28 28 28
Note: All ﬁscal variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita.
a Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough ﬁxed effects include
b Bias corrected LSDV dynamic panel data estimator suggested by Bruno (2005a,b).
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.depression years from 1929 to 1937 and zero otherwise. The results
are reported in Panel B of Table 9. The dummy variable is positive and
signiﬁcant, as expected, for current spending, current income and tax in-
come. Thedepression yearswere, on average, associatedwith larger sur-
pluses. More importantly, the evidence for the political budget cycle
from Tables 6 and 7 is robust after controlling for Great Depression. We
conclude from this that the Great Depression did exert some inﬂuence(4) (5) (6)
l expenditure Capital expenditure Administration Administration
0.16⁎⁎ 0.44⁎⁎⁎ 0.49⁎⁎⁎
[2.29] [3.99] [10.0]
−1.25 −0.032⁎⁎⁎ −0.033⁎⁎⁎
8] [−1.54] [−4.55] [−3.43]
−0.11 0.0010 0.0013
1] [−0.91] [0.79] [0.87]
53 −0.000017 −4.1e−06 −4.2e−06
[−0.016] [−0.31] [−0.34]
79 0.000077 −5.0e−06⁎⁎⁎ −4.7e−06⁎⁎⁎
[0.68] [−2.89] [−3.49]
1.21 −0.011 −0.011
[1.12] [−0.58] [−0.88]
−2.33⁎⁎ 0.067⁎⁎ 0.067⁎⁎⁎
6] [−1.98] [2.09] [4.71]
0.0060 0.00064⁎⁎ 0.00054
[0.14] [2.26] [1.06]
8 −0.017⁎⁎ 0.00096⁎⁎⁎ 0.00095⁎⁎⁎
1] [−2.13] [14.9] [10.2]
ffectsa LSDVb Fixed effectsa LSDVb
336 336 336
0.60
28 28 28
d.
Table 6
Estimation results for revenue outcomes and current deﬁcit for the universal suffrage sample, 1921–1937.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Current income Current income Capital income Capital income Rate income Rate income Deﬁcit Deﬁcit
Lagged dep. var. 0.75⁎⁎⁎ 0.84⁎⁎⁎ 0.53⁎⁎⁎ 0.61⁎⁎⁎ 0.68⁎⁎⁎ 0.74⁎⁎⁎ −0.040 0.017
[11.4] [20.1] [6.54] [11.6] [11.2] [29.9] [−0.41] [0.32]
Election −1.01⁎⁎⁎ −1.09⁎⁎⁎ 0.59 0.60 −0.16 −0.31 0.47⁎⁎⁎ 0.48⁎⁎
[−4.47] [−2.96] [1.31] [1.15] [−0.26] [−0.31] [3.14] [2.46]
Population growth −0.000074⁎⁎ −0.000078⁎ −0.000040⁎⁎ −0.000049 −0.00012⁎⁎ −0.00015 −0.00004⁎⁎ −0.00004
[−2.36] [−1.68] [−2.23] [−0.99] [−2.57] [−1.32] [−2.52] [−1.48]
Population −0.000013 −0.000014 −8.2e−06 −0.000011 −8.7e−07 −8.2e−06 0.067 0.063
[−1.62] [−1.25] [−1.12] [−0.90] [−0.086] [−0.29] [0.33] [0.22]
Age structure −0.98⁎⁎⁎ −0.72⁎ −0.40 −0.42 −0.42 −0.42 −8.7e−06⁎ −8.2e−06
[−3.64] [−1.94] [−1.50] [−1.25] [−1.04] [−0.54] [−2.00] [−1.41]
Population density −1.00 −1.20⁎ −0.68 −0.93 −0.17 −1.07 −0.33⁎⁎ −0.30⁎
[−1.21] [−1.91] [−1.24] [−1.42] [−0.18] [−0.70] [−2.41] [−1.72]
Wealth 0.0036⁎ 0.0033⁎⁎⁎ 0.0036⁎⁎⁎ 0.0034⁎⁎⁎ 0.021⁎⁎⁎ 0.020⁎⁎⁎ −0.87⁎⁎ −0.82⁎⁎⁎
[1.84] [4.95] [5.13] [4.64] [3.92] [14.0] [−2.26] [−2.59]
Estimation method Fixed effectsa LSDVb Fixed effectsa LSDVb Fixed effectsa LSDVb Fixed effectsa LSDVb
Observations 448 448 448 448 392c 392c 448 448
R-squared 0.802 0.379 0.871 0.056
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Note: All ﬁscal variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita.
a Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough ﬁxed effects included.
b Bias corrected LSDV dynamic panel data estimator suggested by Bruno (2005a,b).
c Sample from 1923 to 1937.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
67T.S. Aidt, G. Mooney / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 53–71on the public ﬁnances of the LMBs but was not itself responsible for the
difference in the nature of the political budget cycle before and after the
extension of the franchise.
8.4. Heterogeneous election year effects
The baseline results concern the average election year effect across
the 28 LMBs in the two samples. This may mask important heterogene-
ity. To investigate this, we have re-estimated the baseline speciﬁcationTable 7
Estimation results for expenditure outcomes for the universal suffrage sample, 1921–1937.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Current expenditure Current expenditure Capita
Lagged dep. var. 0.72⁎⁎⁎ 0.79⁎⁎⁎ 0.45⁎⁎
[9.93] [19.4] [7.71]
Election −0.55⁎⁎⁎ −0.59⁎⁎ 0.93⁎⁎
[−4.17] [−1.97] [2.35]
Population growth −0.000091⁎⁎⁎ −0.000096⁎⁎ −0.00
[−3.77] [−2.54] [−2.22
Population −0.000016⁎⁎ −0.000018⁎⁎ −9.0e
[−2.18] [−1.98] [−1.20
Age structure −0.67⁎⁎⁎ −0.62⁎⁎ 0.36
[−2.91] [−1.98] [1.34]
Population density −1.51⁎⁎ −1.71⁎⁎⁎ −1.09
[−2.20] [−3.32] [−2.00
Debt 0.029⁎⁎ 0.023⁎⁎⁎ 0.047⁎
[2.49] [3.58] [3.35]
Wealth 0.0040⁎⁎ 0.0039⁎⁎⁎ 0.0031
[2.38] [7.01] [4.61]
Estimation method Fixed effectsa LSDVb Fixed e
Observations 448 448 448
R-squared 0.87 0.54
Number of boroughs 28 28 28
Note: All ﬁscal variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita.
a Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough ﬁxed effects include
b Bias corrected LSDV dynamic panel data estimator suggested by Bruno (2005a,b).
c Sample from 1923 to 1937.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.with a set of 28 borough-speciﬁc election year dummyvariables. The re-
sults are summarized in Tables 10 and 11 which report the coefﬁcient
on the election year dummy for each borough for the two samples.
We observe someheterogeneity as onewould expect, but there is no in-
dication that the average results are driven by one or two outliers.
Table 10, with the results from the taxpayer suffrage, is sorted according
to the size of the electorate (franchise extension). While the point esti-
mates on the vast majority of borough-speciﬁc election year effects in
the current income and tax income regressions are negative and(4) (5) (6)
l expenditure Capital expenditure Administration Administration
⁎ 0.53⁎⁎⁎ 0.69⁎⁎⁎ 0.78⁎⁎⁎
[11.7] [9.37] [18.3]
0.94⁎⁎⁎ 0.080 0.078
[2.72] [1.44] [1.23]
0047⁎⁎ −0.000049 −9.9e−06⁎⁎ −0.000012⁎
] [−1.14] [−2.73] [−1.70]
−06 −0.000010 −1.3e−06 −1.9e−06
] [−0.97] [−0.88] [−1.05]
0.30 −0.13⁎⁎ −0.13⁎
[0.88] [−2.45] [−1.75]
⁎ −1.18⁎⁎ −0.13 −0.20⁎
] [−2.04] [−1.11] [−1.74]
⁎⁎ 0.041⁎⁎⁎ 0.0038⁎⁎ 0.0024⁎⁎
[5.82] [2.65] [2.11]
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0031⁎⁎⁎ 0.00046 0.00044⁎⁎⁎
[4.81] [1.48] [4.22]
ffectsa LSDVb Fixed effectsa LSDVb
448 392c 392c
0.81
28 28 28
d.
Table 8
Robustness checks for the taxpayer suffrage sample, 1902–14.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Current income Capital income Rate income Deﬁcit Current expenditure Capital expenditure Administration
Panel A
Election −0.47⁎⁎⁎ −1.43 −0.49⁎⁎ 0.36⁎⁎⁎ −0.022 −1.08 −0.032⁎⁎⁎
[−3.29] [−1.26] [−2.54] [2.79] [−0.10] [−1.04] [−4.54]
Left −0.16 4.01 0.14 −0.034 0.42⁎ 3.43 −0.012
[−0.52] [1.56] [0.25] [−0.22] [1.74] [1.29] [−0.63]
Panel B
Election −0.47⁎⁎⁎ −1.57 −0.50⁎⁎ 0.36⁎⁎ −0.039 −1.19 −0.032⁎⁎⁎
[−3.24] [−1.30] [−2.55] [2.74] [−0.17] [−1.07] [−4.53]
Absent owners −0.000080 0.00037 −0.00023 −0.00011 0.00033 0.00029 −0.000027
[−0.15] [0.30] [−0.24] [−0.33] [0.63] [0.23] [−0.65]
Estimation method Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Note: All ﬁscal variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita. All estimations include a lagged dependent variable and the same control variables as in Table 4. The results are
similar with the LSDV estimator.
a Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough ﬁxed effects included.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
Table 9
Robustness checks for the universal suffrage sample, 1921–37.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Current income Capital income Rate income Deﬁcit Current expenditure Capital expenditure Administration
Panel A
Election −1.02⁎⁎⁎ 0.59 −0.21 0.47⁎⁎⁎ −0.55⁎⁎⁎ 0.93⁎⁎ 0.084
[−4.43] [1.31] [−0.34] [3.14] [−4.13] [2.35] [1.43]
Left 0.72 −0.23 1.20 0.067 0.74 0.077 −0.070
[1.24] [−0.40] [1.40] [0.33] [1.18] [0.099] [−0.50]
Panel B
Election −1.70⁎⁎⁎ 0.57 −0.87⁎ 0.71⁎⁎⁎ −1.15⁎⁎⁎ 0.92⁎⁎ −0.0093
[−6.97] [1.26] [−1.94] [3.48] [−7.46] [2.37] [−0.15]
Great Depression 6.16⁎⁎⁎ 0.21 4.95⁎⁎ −0.76⁎⁎ 5.40⁎⁎⁎ 0.020 0.60⁎⁎⁎
[7.82] [0.48] [2.14] [−2.57] [9.26] [0.037] [6.05]
Estimation method Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa Fixed effectsa
Observations 448 448 392 448 448 448 392
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Note: All ﬁscal variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita. All estimations include a lagged dependent variable and the same control variables as in Table 5. The results are
similar with the LSDV estimator.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
a Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough ﬁxed effects included.
26 Brender and Drazen (2005) make a distinction between “new” and “old” democracies
andmake use of the Polity IV database to do so (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). The Policy IV
index categorises countries according to a range of political authority patterns to arrive at a
country score. The index, however, does not capture variations in the suffrage rules direct-
ly and so does not effectively distinguish regimes along this dimension.
68 T.S. Aidt, G. Mooney / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 53–71signiﬁcant, there are a few boroughs where the effect is positive. These
are concentrated in boroughs with the most restricted franchise. This is
consistent with the ﬁnding in Aidt et al. (2010) that retrenchment is
most pronouncedwhere penny-consciousmiddle class voters gain con-
trol of the councils.
8.5. Other robustness checks
We have checked whether the null result for capital expenditure and
capital income in the taxpayer suffrage sample can be attributed to the
large investment recorded for St. Marylebone in 1905. Excluding this
borough from the sample does not affect any of the results [not
reported].
9. Conclusion
The evidence base for the existence of political budget cycles is over-
whelming. Politicians use the ﬁscal levers granted to them to win re-
election if they can. How this plays out is, unsurprisingly, a function of
the institutional constraints imposed on the elected representatives.As pointed out by Brender and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson
(2006) and many others, the political budget cycle is conditional. We
contribute to the literature on the conditional political budget cycle in
two main ways. Firstly, the focus of previous research has been on the
period after the Second World War. In contrast, we enlist data from
the early part of the 20th century and ﬁnd that the political budget
cycle is by no means a recent phenomenon: it was alive and kicking in
London both in the years leading up to the First World War and during
the interwar period. Secondly, precisely because of the emphasis on
modern data, previous research explored the political budget cycle in
the context of universal suffrage.26 Our historical perspective allows us
to investigate the nature of the cycle under two different suffrage re-
gimes and we ﬁnd that it differs in marked but predictable ways.
Table 10
The election year effect by borough for the seven ﬁscal outcomes, 1902–14.
Borough FE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Current income Capital income Rate income Deﬁcit Current expenditure Capital expenditure Administration
Stepney 38 0.55⁎⁎⁎ 0.48 0.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.48⁎⁎⁎ −0.38⁎⁎⁎ −0.023 −0.024⁎⁎⁎
Hammersmith 50 −1.66⁎⁎⁎ 0.078 −1.37⁎⁎⁎ 0.32⁎⁎⁎ 0.48⁎⁎⁎ −2.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.038⁎⁎⁎
Islington 53 –0.42⁎⁎⁎ −0.77⁎ –0.62⁎⁎⁎ −0.022 −0.16⁎⁎⁎ −0.90⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎⁎
Poplar 53 0.47⁎⁎⁎ –0.98⁎⁎⁎ –0.37⁎⁎⁎ 1.29⁎⁎⁎ 0.45⁎⁎⁎ −0.76⁎ −0.046⁎⁎⁎
Bethnal Green 57 0.00043 −0.65⁎ –0.31⁎⁎⁎ −0.29⁎⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎⁎ −0.32 −0.015⁎⁎⁎
St. Pancras 57 –0.56⁎⁎⁎ −0.0044 –0.47⁎⁎⁎ 0.16 0.23⁎⁎⁎ −0.59 −0.036⁎⁎⁎
Greenwich 58 0.85⁎⁎⁎ −0.19 0.44⁎⁎⁎ 0.43⁎⁎⁎ −0.29⁎⁎⁎ −0.49 −0.026⁎⁎⁎
Lambeth 59 –0.87⁎⁎⁎ −0.59 –0.77⁎⁎⁎ 0.29⁎⁎ −0.041 −0.72 −0.033⁎⁎⁎
Stoke-Newington 59 0.36⁎⁎⁎ −0.13 –0.35⁎⁎⁎ −0.46⁎⁎⁎ −0.24⁎⁎⁎ 0.31 −0.096⁎⁎⁎
Woolwich 59 –1.68⁎⁎⁎ –3.37⁎⁎⁎ –1.52⁎⁎⁎ 0.84⁎⁎⁎ −0.53⁎⁎⁎ −4.09⁎⁎⁎ −0.097⁎⁎⁎
Southwark 61 –0.81⁎⁎⁎ −0.12 –0.96⁎⁎⁎ −0.38⁎⁎⁎ −0.096 0.14 −0.022⁎⁎⁎
Deptford 62 –1.01⁎⁎⁎ −0.61 –0.74⁎⁎⁎ −0.72⁎⁎⁎ 0.097⁎⁎⁎ 0.036 0.029⁎⁎⁎
Hackney 62 –0.65⁎⁎⁎ −1.17⁎⁎ –0.78⁎⁎⁎ −0.72⁎⁎⁎ −0.0014 −0.25 −0.057⁎⁎⁎
Westminster 62 –1.12⁎⁎⁎ −1.92 –2.09⁎⁎⁎ −0.30⁎⁎⁎ 4.99⁎⁎⁎ 1.21 −0.12⁎⁎⁎
Bermondsey 63 –1.23⁎⁎⁎ −2.09⁎⁎⁎ –0.92⁎⁎⁎ 0.51⁎⁎⁎ −0.13⁎⁎⁎ −0.50 −0.034⁎⁎⁎
Chelsea 63 −0.24⁎⁎ −1.73⁎⁎ –1.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.97⁎⁎⁎ −0.35⁎⁎⁎ −0.78 −0.031⁎⁎⁎
Fulham 63 0.11 –2.71⁎⁎⁎ –0.17⁎⁎⁎ 0.74⁎⁎⁎ −0.99⁎⁎⁎ −1.47⁎⁎⁎ −0.015⁎⁎⁎
St. Marylebone 63 –0.46⁎⁎⁎ –21.4⁎⁎⁎ 0.65⁎⁎⁎ 0.50⁎⁎⁎ 0.15 −17.3⁎⁎⁎ −0.00018
Finsbury 64 –0.31⁎⁎⁎ −1.32⁎ –0.95⁎⁎⁎ 0.58⁎⁎⁎ −0.082⁎ −1.18 −0.041⁎⁎⁎
Shoreditch 64 0.13 –1.58⁎⁎⁎ 2.29⁎⁎⁎ −0.56⁎⁎⁎ −0.26⁎⁎⁎ 0.10 −0.025⁎⁎⁎
Holborn 66 –1.01⁎⁎⁎ −1.93 –0.69⁎⁎⁎ 1.23⁎⁎⁎ −1.30⁎⁎⁎ −1.12 −0.032⁎⁎⁎
Camberwell 67 –0.64⁎⁎⁎ 0.12 −0.72⁎⁎⁎ 0.20⁎⁎⁎ −0.065⁎ −0.085 0.036⁎⁎⁎
Kensington 67 –0.54⁎⁎⁎ −1.02 –0.29⁎⁎⁎ 0.85⁎⁎⁎ 0.85⁎⁎⁎ −1.44⁎ 0.013⁎⁎⁎
Paddington 68 –0.29⁎⁎ −0.41 −0.26⁎⁎ 0.36⁎⁎⁎ −0.33⁎⁎⁎ −0.92 −0.031⁎⁎⁎
Hampstead 70 –2.15⁎⁎⁎ −2.01⁎⁎ –1.28⁎⁎⁎ 1.78⁎⁎⁎ −0.97⁎⁎⁎ −1.96⁎⁎⁎ 0.00024
Lewisham 70 –0.28⁎⁎⁎ 0.73⁎ −0.34⁎⁎⁎ 0.72⁎⁎⁎ 0.21⁎⁎⁎ 0.061 −0.081⁎⁎⁎
Wandsworth 70 0.90⁎⁎⁎ −0.89⁎⁎ 0.60⁎⁎⁎ 0.31⁎⁎⁎ −0.099 −0.41 −0.049⁎⁎⁎
Battersea 71 –0.67⁎⁎⁎ −0.040 –1.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.79⁎⁎⁎ −0.70⁎⁎⁎ 0.98⁎⁎ −0.0077⁎⁎⁎
Note: FE is franchise extension (the suffrage as a percentage of the adult male population). The coefﬁcients reported are borough speciﬁc election year effects. Signiﬁcant positive election
effects are in bold. All estimations include borough ﬁxed effect and the control variables reported in Tables 4 and 5. Stars are based on robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
Table 11
The election year effect by borough for the seven ﬁscal outcomes, 1921–37.
Borough (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Current income Capital income Rate income Deﬁcit Current expenditure Capital expenditure Administration
Battersea −1.82⁎⁎⁎ −0.16⁎⁎⁎ −0.87⁎⁎⁎ 1.22⁎⁎⁎ −0.50⁎⁎⁎ 0.24⁎⁎⁎ −0.16⁎⁎⁎
Bermondsey 2.20⁎⁎⁎ −2.91⁎⁎⁎ 4.10⁎⁎⁎ −1.15⁎⁎⁎ −0.63⁎⁎⁎ −3.12⁎⁎⁎ 0.065⁎
Bethnal Green −0.95⁎⁎⁎ 2.80⁎⁎⁎ −2.55⁎⁎⁎ 0.76⁎⁎⁎ −0.51⁎⁎⁎ −2.70⁎⁎⁎ −0.19⁎⁎⁎
Camberwell 0.60⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎ 1.01⁎⁎⁎ 0.17 0.55⁎⁎⁎ −0.63⁎⁎⁎ −0.023⁎
Chelsea −0.96⁎⁎⁎ −2.63⁎⁎⁎ −0.56⁎⁎⁎ −0.087 −1.80⁎⁎⁎ −1.69⁎⁎⁎ 0.0020
Westminster −0.78 4.83⁎⁎⁎ 17.7⁎⁎ 1.97⁎⁎⁎ 0.34 3.41⁎⁎⁎ 0.18
Deptford −2.39⁎⁎⁎ 1.55⁎⁎⁎ −1.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.43⁎⁎⁎ −1.21⁎⁎⁎ 0.41⁎⁎⁎ −0.070⁎⁎⁎
Finsbury −2.90⁎⁎⁎ 4.34⁎⁎⁎ −0.75⁎ 1.88⁎⁎⁎ −0.92⁎⁎⁎ 7.18⁎⁎⁎ −0.12⁎⁎⁎
Fulham −1.11⁎⁎⁎ −1.44⁎⁎⁎ 0.052 0.76⁎⁎⁎ 0.0063 0.13 0.11⁎⁎⁎
Greenwich −1.18⁎⁎⁎ 5.02⁎⁎⁎ −0.30⁎⁎ 0.48⁎⁎⁎ −0.95⁎⁎⁎ 3.01⁎⁎⁎ 0.27⁎⁎⁎
Hackney −1.60⁎⁎⁎ 1.30⁎⁎⁎ −1.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.68⁎⁎⁎ −0.77⁎⁎⁎ 0.11⁎ −0.062⁎⁎⁎
Hammersmith −0.88⁎⁎⁎ −3.84⁎⁎⁎ −0.22 0.37⁎⁎ −0.86⁎⁎⁎ 1.59⁎⁎⁎ 1.06⁎⁎⁎
Hampstead 0.55⁎⁎⁎ −1.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.33⁎⁎⁎ −0.74⁎⁎⁎ −0.56⁎⁎⁎ 2.34⁎⁎⁎ 0.24⁎⁎⁎
Holborn −1.97⁎⁎⁎ 0.10 −6.91⁎⁎⁎ 2.02⁎⁎⁎ −1.96⁎⁎⁎ 0.94⁎⁎⁎ −0.37⁎⁎⁎
Islington −2.70⁎⁎⁎ 1.47⁎⁎⁎ −0.80 1.63⁎⁎⁎ −0.85⁎⁎⁎ 1.44⁎⁎⁎ 0.048⁎
Kensington −0.66⁎⁎⁎ −1.74⁎⁎⁎ −0.18 0.73⁎⁎⁎ −0.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎⁎ −0.036⁎⁎
Lambeth −1.36⁎⁎⁎ 1.09⁎⁎⁎ −0.50⁎⁎⁎ 0.51⁎⁎⁎ −0.76⁎⁎⁎ −0.44⁎⁎⁎ −0.0035
Lewisham −0.40⁎⁎⁎ 2.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.36⁎ 0.072 −0.83⁎⁎⁎ 0.72⁎⁎⁎ −0.024⁎
Paddington 0.91⁎⁎⁎ 1.36⁎⁎⁎ 0.95⁎⁎⁎ −0.078 −0.47⁎⁎⁎ 0.57⁎⁎⁎ 0.032⁎⁎
Poplar 0.59⁎⁎⁎ −1.22⁎⁎⁎ 1.86⁎⁎⁎ −0.24 −0.69⁎⁎⁎ −0.85⁎⁎⁎ −0.24⁎⁎⁎
Shoreditch −1.37⁎⁎⁎ −1.68⁎⁎⁎ −0.84⁎⁎⁎ 0.027 −0.98⁎⁎⁎ −1.26⁎⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎⁎
Southwark −3.35⁎⁎⁎ −0.32⁎⁎⁎ −1.69⁎⁎⁎ 1.73⁎⁎⁎ −1.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.35⁎⁎⁎ 0.56⁎⁎⁎
St. Marylebone −2.43⁎⁎⁎ 2.92⁎⁎⁎ −3.58⁎⁎⁎ 1.03⁎⁎⁎ −0.88⁎⁎⁎ 3.96⁎⁎⁎ 0.091⁎⁎⁎
St. Pancras −0.41⁎⁎⁎ 1.82⁎⁎⁎ −0.69⁎⁎⁎ 0.19 −0.025 1.59⁎⁎⁎ −0.044⁎⁎
Stepney −1.80⁎⁎⁎ −1.10⁎⁎⁎ −2.67⁎⁎⁎ 0.68⁎⁎⁎ −0.36 1.86⁎⁎⁎ 0.082⁎⁎⁎
Stoke−Newington −1.09⁎⁎⁎ 2.84⁎⁎⁎ −2.02⁎⁎⁎ 1.81⁎⁎⁎ 1.31⁎⁎⁎ 1.81⁎⁎⁎ 0.037⁎⁎⁎
Wandsworth −0.44⁎⁎⁎ 2.66⁎⁎⁎ −0.55⁎⁎⁎ 0.16 −0.20⁎⁎⁎ 1.83⁎⁎⁎ 0.49⁎⁎⁎
Woolwich −0.86⁎⁎⁎ −1.31⁎⁎⁎ −0.76⁎⁎⁎ 0.93⁎⁎⁎ 0.60⁎⁎⁎ 3.68⁎⁎⁎ 0.054⁎⁎⁎
Note: The coefﬁcients reported are borough speciﬁc election year effects. Signiﬁcant positive election effects are in bold. All estimations include borough ﬁxed effect and the control
variables reported in Tables 6 and 7. Stars are based on robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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70 T.S. Aidt, G. Mooney / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 53–71This strengthens the existing evidence base that the political budget
cycle is contingent on political institutions and rules. Persson and
Tabellini (2003), Streb et al. (2009), and Klomp and de Haan (2012)
have previously demonstrated that election rules, regime types and leg-
islative checks and balances affect the nature of political budget cycles in
modern democracies. Gonzalez (2002) ﬁnds that the political budget
cycle in Mexico was magniﬁed as democratic institutions improve in
quality while Potrafke (2012) reports that the cycle is stronger under
two- rather than under multi-party systems. Others have found that
the experience of voters, information ﬂows and ﬁscal transparency are
also important.27 The picture that emerges from this literature has yet
to come into sharp focus, but one lesson is clear: context is crucial for
the incentive and ability of incumbent politicians to manipulate expen-
diture and taxes for electoral gain. We have added new evidence to the
understanding of the conditional nature of the political budget cycle by
demonstrating that the suffrage rules themselves matter.
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